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Abstract 
 
New modern aid was initiated during the latter half of the 1990s by most of the 
leading actors within the international donor community to make the whole aid-
procedure more effective, more lucid and more on the receiving states’ conditions. 
Budget Support is a tool within this “partnership-aid” transformation where the 
distribution goes directly to the receiver state’s governmental budget and thus 
strengthens the institutions of the state. As the governmental institutions gain more 
power, other actors might gain less power than before. It is problematic if Civil 
Society gains less power because one prerequisite to obtain Budget Support is to have 
a well functioning Civil Society. So if Budget Support leads to a weaker Civil Society 
it undermines the initial prerequisites to obtain Budget Support in the first place. The 
core of this thesis is to see whether this possible paradox is a reality.  
 
The target for this thesis is Uganda, a country which has been a pioneer in 
implementing new aid initiatives by the donor community, with an elaborate Budget 
Support framework. The study focuses on effects from Budget Support on Anti-
Corruption Organizations (AC-CSOs) within Civil Society. To make the effects 
visual, the AC-CSOs’ relation to donors and the Government of Uganda (GoU) after 
the Budget Support implementation is investigated. Qualitative research interviews 
are made with 16 AC-CSOs. 
 
The findings show that most of the interviewed AC-CSOs are marginalized by the 
GoU after Budget Support implementation and almost half of them are marginalized 
by donors. Thus, Budget Support tends to be a part of the marginalization process for 
AC-CSOs. The direct distribution of funds to the GoU increases the government’s 
power and the process tends to lead to a position/object relation with AC-CSOs. Also, 
donors tend not to give AC-CSOs the support to stop this process. In addition, donors 
favour Watchdog Organizations over Service Delivery Organizations. As Civil 
Society tends to be weakened with Budget Support implementation, the structure of 
Budget Support could be considered as unsustainable in Uganda.      
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Government, Donors, Uganda 
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1. Introduction: 
1.1. The subject and problem 
This thesis explores the issue of Budget Support effects on Anti-Corruption Organizations 
(AC-CSOs). Budget Support is a tool in the new ideas of a “partnership-aid” structure, where 
the distribution goes directly to the receiver state’s governmental budget and thus strengthens 
the institutions of the state. As the distribution of funds strengthens governmental institutions, 
it is interesting to see the effects on actors in Civil Society. One requirement to obtain Budget 
Support is a well functioning Civil Society. But if Budget Support leads to a weaker Civil 
Society it actually undermines the fundamental prerequisites to initially obtains the support. If 
this paradox is a reality, Budget Support will become unsustainable in the long term.   
 
Function of AC-
CSOs 
Institutional 
prerequisites 
Function of 
AC-CSOs 
Budget Support 
The problem Background 
 Figure 1:1 Subject and Problem 
1.2. Aim and Research Questions 
The aim of this study is to discover effects from Budget Support implementation on Anti-
Corruption Organizations (AC-CSOs).  
 
To fulfil the aim, I have three related research questions: 
1. What effects does Budget Support have on Anti-Corruption Organizations in 
Uganda?   
2. Are the effects from Budget Support similar for different types of Anti-Corruption 
Organizations in Uganda? 
3. Why have these effects occurred?  
1.3. Disposition 
After this short introduction, the background chapter (chapter two) explains the subject and 
problem in more detail. Then the theoretical approach (chapter three) presents different 
perspectives of possible answers for the research questions. These perspectives are used to 
develop 10 hypotheses, described in chapter four. Chapter five introduces the analytical 
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framework, where tools of operation are described and the methodological considerations 
thereafter explain how the empirical findings are collected. After that, the analysis of the 
empirical findings is presented (chapter six). Finally, the conclusions are explained, the 
research questions are answered and the aim is obtained (chapter seven).    
 
2. Background: 
The first two boxes in figure 1:1 illustrate the background of the problem whereas the last two 
boxes illustrate the actual problem of this thesis. To understand the problem, two issues must 
be reviewed. First, the function of Budget Support and its context of Uganda need to be 
explained in detail. Second, corruption and AC-CSOs in Uganda needs to be explained in 
detail. I have chosen to use the Anti-Corruption area to represent Civil Society because it is 
important, topically, and has a more focused approach than investigating Civil Society as a 
whole.     
2.1. Budget Support 
Budget Support is an initiative which is in line with the focus on “new modern aid” or “new 
partnership aid”. It is a form of programme aid that is not linked to specific project activities, 
but is instead channelled from donors directly to partner governments, so that the 
governments use their own allocation, procurement and accounting system (IDD et al 2, 
2006:1). Ideally, with Budget Support as a financial tool, governments have a more 
independent role. Donors do not have the possibility to control the financial inputs, as much 
as they used to. By using Budget Support as a tool, improvements are supposed to be carried 
out in efficiency, transparency and accountability between governments, the countries’ 
parliamentary institutions and electorate (ActionAid & CARE 1, 2006:18). In order to 
understand Budget Support in its context, a brief introduction of foreign aid and the new 
structure is necessary. 
 
Foreign aid is an initiative by rich countries to reduce poverty, stabilize and develop societies 
in the world. As these financial inputs are “donations”, a demand of efficiency is unavoidable. 
The aid system is often criticized for being inefficient. The rise of Budget Support is a 
reaction to the approach of the late 1990s, when the major bilateral and multilateral donors 
wanted a change in the aid structure. Traditional project support had not delivered the result 
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that was expected (ActionAid & CARE 1, 2006:9)1. Instead, explanations for the causes of 
poverty were more focused on public spending. Therefore, the donors needed to work more 
directly with governments (ActionAid & CARE 2, 2006:3). The Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP) was a recall for this system. The PRSP is an instrument that promotes national 
ownership of the development process (ActionAid & CARE 1, 2006:9). The aim of PRSP is 
to provide a crucial link between national public actions, donor support and development 
outcomes (IMF1, 2005). Derived from the PRSP, the ideas of Budget Support were initiated. 
Coordination by international donors has developed to an important issue of aid development 
to reduce the work and cost of often weak administrations of receiving states. Switches from 
plenty of small projects into fewer large projects and support to reforms and development 
programmes on sector- and national level are indicators to be used in the coordination strategy 
(Wohlgemuth, 1997:22). In 2005, the Paris Declaration was established which among other 
things decided that aid support should be distributed more on the conditions of receiver states, 
alignment where donors use receiver states’ systems for delivery and a harmonization where 
donors cooperate and simplify the distribution procedures (Paris declaration1, 2005)2. As a 
response to the demands of efficiency and the Paris declaration, Budget Support has been 
more and more established in the world.  
 
There are two types of Budget Support, Sector Budget Support (SBS) and General Budget 
Support (GBS). SBS is earmarked to a discrete sector or sectors with related conditionality to 
these sectors, while GBS is disbursed to the receiving state’s budget as a whole without 
claims of earmarking (IDD et al 1, 2006:6). This thesis concerns both of these types, which 
will be explored below in the context of Uganda.   
2.1.1. Budget Support in Uganda 
In the context of Uganda, one can understand the rapidly ongoing process with Budget 
Support in the country. The Government of Uganda (GoU) has since president Yoweri 
Museveni took power in 1986 established good relationships with the donor community. 
Uganda was the first country to qualify for the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative 
                                                 
1 The donor community believes in general that project support has evolved into a disunited support where it is 
hard for the donors to have an overview of all the aid initiatives that are in progress. Thus it becomes divided and 
confusing and it is hard to follow up projects. Furthermore, project support is also a problem because donors are 
in control of the money and have therefore a dominant position with the receiver. Thus it may cause a problem of 
democracy (Sida1, 2005). 
2 For more information on the Paris Declaration, see for example www.aidharmonization.org  
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(HIPC), dept relief, PRSP and the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC).3 
All these initiatives have also made Uganda a pioneer in the implementation of Budget 
Support. It evolved through several innovations. In 1997, Uganda made their own PRSP 
called Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), which is a framework of the government’s 
own poverty reduction strategy4. Before PEAP, Uganda’s aid was fragmented and poorly 
coordinated. Three innovative steps were made in the evolvement process of Budget Support. 
First were the Sector Wide Approaches (SWAp), where the idea was to align donors and 
budget resources towards sector strategies. Joint Sectoral review processes were important for 
policy focused dialogue with donors, the GoU and Civil Society. SWAp was a platform for 
more flexible support, notionally earmarked SBS. Second was the Poverty Action Fund 
(PAF), which is a SBS that notionally is earmarked to finance five key PEAP programs5. PAF 
was made to improve budget management and enhance the accountability of expenditures. 
Quarterly PAF review meetings, which included Civil Society, were held to discuss PAF 
performance. PAF made donors shift from Project Support to Budget Support in Uganda. 
Third were the Partnership Principles introduced in the context of the new PEAP2 in 2001. 
Now, large donors like the World Bank and DFID moved to unearmarked GBS. The GoU set 
out its framework which among other things worked for further development of participation 
and coordination of all stakeholders, Civil Society included (IDD et al 2, 2006:7-17).6 
Consequently, Budget Support has had a significant impact since it was first introduced in 
1998:   
 
(USD million) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Total ODA 839,32 909,36 695,61 901,28 897,01 815,27 1076,47 1334,84 
Total BS 
disbursement 
0 66,43 39,16 175,86 311,20 369,00 404,83 408,80 
BS as total ODA 
(%) 
0 7,13% 5,63% 19,51% 34,69% 45,26% 37,61% 30,63% 
Table 2:1 Aid Flows and PGBS to Uganda (IDD et al 2, 2006:180). 
 
                                                 
3  The HIPC initiative, made by IMF and the WB entails coordinated action by the international financial 
community, including multilateral organizations and governments, to reduce to sustainable levels the external 
debt burdens of the most heavily indebted poor countries (IMF2, 2007). The debt relief was an initiative to 
dismiss debts of poor countries which strategically work for development in line with the donor community. The 
PRSCs was initiated by the WB in 2001 and was the first attempt of unearmarked GBS (IDD et al 2, 2006).  
4 PEAP has been revised twice, in 2000 and 2004.  
5 Universal Primary Education, Primary Health Care, Safe Water and Sanitation, Agriculture and Rural Roads. 
6 For more detailed information of the frameworks of PAF and Partnership Principles, see Appendix 3 and 4. 
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So Budget Support in Uganda is given in three different ways, through SBS, PAF and GBS. 
SBS is notionally earmarked to a particular sector, subsector or program within the sector 
whether inside or outside the PAF. PAF is nominally earmarked to the fund as a whole and 
not to individual sectors. Thus, PAF and SBS can be the same thing. GBS is completely 
unearmarked (IDD et al 2, 2006:18). When I refer to Budget Support, I include SBS, PAF and 
GBS.7 GBS represents the largest amount of Budget Support:  
 
Types of Budget Support Number of Donors Disbursed amount (USD million)   
Sector Budget Support (SBS) 
(1998/99-2003/04 ) 
13 509   
Poverty Action Fund (PAF) 
( 1998/99- 2003/04 ) 
5 145  
General Budget Support (GBS) 
(1999/00-2003/04 ) 
6 713  
 Table 2:2 Types of Budget Support (IDD et al 2, 2006:18) 
 
Budget Support has increased from 26 percent of programme aid in 1999/00 to 99 percent in 
2004/05. Programme aid as a proportion of total aid in Uganda has increased from 36 percent 
in 1999/00 to 56 percent in 2001/02 and it has stayed above 50 percent since then (IDD et al 
2, 2006:22). 50 percent of the governmental budget (public expenditures) is taken from aid-
flows. (IDD et al 2, 2006:s2). That makes Uganda a very aid-dependent country. Thus, 
Budget Support is having a significant impact on development assistance and the total 
expenditures in Uganda.  
2.1.2. Institutional prerequisites for obtaining Budget Support in Uganda 
Demands related to Budget Support are to follow the recommendations of PEAP 1-3, SWAp, 
PAF and the Partnership Principles. The visions of these initiatives shall be integrated in 
meetings and decisions. The PRSC in 2001 was the first full Budget Support instrument in 
Uganda, made to support the implementation of PEAP as a whole8. This includes increased 
transparency, participation and reduced corruption with help from Civil Society (IDD et al 2, 
2006:200). Sector Working Groups are central for process and planning. Representatives 
within sectors and other stakeholders, including Civil Society are represented (IDD et al 2, 
                                                 
7 I follow the recommendation from the evaluation report on GBS made by IDD, that SBS and PAF only are 
notionally earmarked and not real earmarked. Real earmarking demands clear pre-agreed budget lines, while 
nominal earmarking releases parts from the demands because of successful innovations, in Uganda the 
completion of sector reviews. Thus, SBS, PAF and GBS are all included in the concept Budget Support (IDD et 
al 2, 2006:23).    
8 See Appendix 5 
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2006:23). Sector Working Groups are examples of the demand of participation which PEAP 
and the other initiatives have created. 
Clearly, donors have demands of a well functioning Civil Society to receive Budget Support. 
Therefore it is important that also donors give space for Civil Society to do their work. The 
responsibility is not just the GoU’s concern but also the donors.   
2.2. Corruption and Anti-Corruption Organizations (AC-CSOs)  
Corruption9 is a major obstacle for development, especially in poor countries. Despite high 
relevance and progress on many fronts, 70 countries scored less than 3 on the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) in 2005. 10 indicates a highly clean rate and 0 indicates a highly 
corrupt rate. Almost 3 billion dollars are spent on bribes every day (Transparency 
International-CPI, 2006). However, corruption is now taken more seriously on the 
international arena than before. The “UN Convention against Corruption” and the “OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention” are examples of relatively recent developed anti-corruption 
strategies. To combat the corruption problem, several areas are important in the process; 
foreign aid and Civil Society included. As anti-corruption nowadays is of great concern, it is 
interesting to use AC-CSOs as targets for this thesis, representing Civil Society.  
 
Corruption is an old concept. Bribes and extra payments for services were common in the 
Roman Empire, the Middle Ages as well as under the colonial years and it still is today. But it 
has not been criticized in a serious manner until recently. Since the middle of the 1990s, a 
debate on what corruption is and how it can be reduced in the best way has emerged. Before 
that, the problem has been given little attention, been ignored or even not been seen as a 
problem. As the debate on corruption has grown stronger, so have also AC-CSOs, both in 
numbers and capacity (Berg, 2005:2). A great part of the literature on corruption indicates 
problems in governmental, Civil Society and international donor community work. Susan 
Rose-Ackerman sees governmental misuse as a cause of corruption. The governments are 
investing too much in large-scale projects which are overpaid and often the wrong kind 
(Rose-Ackerman, 1999:38). Larry Diamond defines African states as “swollen states”. The 
larger the state gets in controlling resources and regulates economic activities, the greater will 
the level of corruption be (Blundo et al, 2006:60). In my opinion, Diamond’s pessimistic ideas 
of governmental work might be too radical but the critics of governmental work are essential 
                                                 
9 A definition of corruption is hard to give as it depends on opinion. My definition is in line with the national 
encyclopaedia of Sweden’s definition: “An abuse of a given position for ones own benefits” (www.ne.se) 
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in the development work of Africa. If there is political will, there will be participative 
opportunities for positive development. Johnston means that political will has to include an 
active political process and a strong leadership so corruption can be fought effectively. 
Fighting corruption is difficult in an environment without political will (Johnston, 2005:83ff). 
To reach this environment, the governments need to include Civil Society. High corrupt 
countries tend to have Civil Societies which are weak, divided or intimidated (Johnston, 
2005:xi). Effective reforms are made when major parts of society are involved, but citizens of 
African countries have often not held their governments accountable because the accountable-
mechanism is not operating well (Johnston, 2005:73f). This accountable-mechanism is a Civil 
Society mechanism. Furthermore, a way to maintain a major part involvement is to create 
coalition buildings, which unfortunately are not common in Africa. Usually, Anti-Corruption 
reforms are separately driven, often by Government with no involvement from Civil Society 
(Johnston, 2005:86). Thus, a strengthening of Civil Society is important for reducing the 
corruption in Africa. Civil Society is also essential to put together the international donor 
community to work more effective. 90 percent of public investments and 30 percent of 
ongoing state expenses in Sub-Saharan Africa derive from aid generated by donors. No 
involvement is neutral and many projects and initiatives feed corruption, overpaying 
bureaucratic cooperatives at national level (Blundo et al, 2006:57). Johnston argues that 
sustainable reforms in Africa must be integral to the domestic agenda and not driven by 
international donors. The reforms must come from within and African citizens are often 
cynical about the international assistance because funds continue to flow to the countries even 
though there is often misrule and high-level corruption (Johnston, 2005:88ff). If AC-CSOs are 
more involved in the process, watching the donors’ investments, corruption could be 
controlled. Thus, AC-CSOs play a crucial role with both government and donors in the fight 
against corruption.   
2.2.1. Anti-Corruption work and AC-CSOs in Uganda 
Even if corruption has different meanings in different regions, countries and societies, one can 
see that Africa is a continent where corruption has been prevalent. In the CPI rating for 2006, 
only two countries, Botswana and Mauritius, were scoring above five in the African region 
(Transparency International-CPI, 2006). African societies are well embedded in the 
corruption process and citizens often take bribes and political and economical misuse for 
granted. Uganda is not an exception. Even if some improvements have been made and last 
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year’s scoring never has been higher in the past decade, the illustration in table 2:3 shows us 
that corruption is highly prevalent in Uganda. 
Table 2:3 Corruption in Uganda (Corruption Perception Index, Transparency International) 
Uganda 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
CPI 2,3 1,9 2,1 2,2 2,6 2,5 2,7 
 
The GoU has launched several efforts to fight corruption. In 1998, 25 Anti-Corruption 
principles were drawn up to combat the problem (Johnston, 2005:82). Institutional efforts like 
the Inspectorate General of Government (IGG) was established in 1998 and is empowered to 
investigate, arrest and prosecute corruption cases, take preventive measures, advise 
government and report to the parliament (IGG, 2007). The institutional office of the Auditor 
General has a role to provide an independent oversight of government operations through 
financial and other management audits (OAG, 2007). These are the most important but the 
GoU has established seven institutions in total, including several articles in the constitution 
and put in place over 10 legal frameworks to reduce the corruption level (CBR, 
2006:appendix). However, the political will is still questioned. The Anti-Corruption Coalition 
of Uganda (ACCU) and Andrew Mwenda highlight several initiatives made from the IGG 
which simply have been ignored by the GoU and all the Anti-Corruption institutions have 
been constantly under-funded, which has affected their work negatively. The GoU spends 1.1 
percent of its budget on accountability institutions while security officially gets 14 percent 
(ACCU, 2006:4ff and Mwenda, 2002:240f). Furthermore, the GoU has decided to treat the 
Auditor General’s reports with secrecy (CBR, 2006:vi). Excluding the public from official 
information is a lack of political will in dealing with the corruption problem.  
 
The GoU, with support from the international donor community, is beginning to engage Civil 
Society in Anti-Corruption work. Cooperation between Civil Society, parliament, government 
officials and donors is a growing trend in Uganda’s struggle against corruption (Mwenda, 
2002:245). But to gain a positive result, the cooperation among the stakeholders has to work 
properly. According to the ACCU, it does not. The role of Civil Society is either minimal or 
non-existing. The environment is hard. Civil society can make pronouncements but there is a 
lack of political will to act (ACCU, 2006:11). But Civil Society is also criticized. CBR’s 
report sees AC-CSOs in Uganda as too liberal to impact in the corruption process. They do 
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not create credible threats on their own. Furthermore, an increasing number of them are 
corrupt themselves (CBR, 2006:33).  
 
The international donor community’s role is important. Around half of Uganda’s budget is 
donor funded. As Uganda is a very corrupt country, one cannot take away the donors’ role in 
it. Even if the donor community has made many efforts in the area, CBR and Blundo argue 
that they have a special responsibility. When they pump in aid funds to Uganda, they have to 
demand from the GoU a stronger support in Anti-Corruption issues. Uganda is seen as a 
success story, which has helped government officials to get away with the high corruption. 
Around 30 percent of the aid money is swindled. Thus, the international donor community is 
still lacking in their efforts against corruption in Uganda (CBR, 2006:34f and Blundo et al, 
2006:57f).  
 
AC-CSOs play an important watchdog role in regards to the GoU and donors in their work 
against corruption. When it comes to Budget Support implementation, AC-CSOs’ role is to be 
a transparent, participative actor in ensuring that good governance rules, so that the flexible 
support which Budget Support is, will be used properly. PEAP PILLAR 2 mentions that to 
ensure Good Governance, which is important to receive Budget Support, Uganda needs to 
reduce corruption with help from Civil Society (IDD et al 2, 2006:200). Corruption is an 
important issue within PEAP and AC-CSOs are the most suitable actors from Civil Society 
dealing with that issue. This includes being a part of how Budget Support shall be distributed 
to effectively decrease the corruption level.  
2.3. Re-introducing the problem 
As described above, Civil Society and AC-CSOs play an important role in the Budget Support 
implementation, through PEAP, SWAp, PAF, Partnership Principles and PRSC. An inclusive 
Civil Society which actively participates in decision-making and dialogue, especially on Anti-
Corruption issues, is important for donors to receive Budget Support. But according to some 
stakeholders, for example the ACCU, Civil Society’s relation to the GoU and donors is not 
working properly. If this is true, the flexible distribution of Budget Support creates a weaker 
Civil Society, which is a fundamental factor for not implementing Budget Support in the first 
place. This thesis is investigating Budget Support effects on AC-CSOs, to see if the structure 
of Budget Support is sustainable in Uganda.      
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3. Theoretical framework: 
In this section, several theories are introduced which are believed to be possible explanations 
of what is happening with AC-CSOs when Budget Support is implemented. The theories will 
be the basic ground for the hypotheses. The first part of this chapter highlights three theories 
which describe how Budget Support affects AC-CSOs and why. The second part describes 
theories within the concept of Civil Society, to make differences in Civil Society visual and 
thus show that different types of organizations are influenced differently by Budget Support. I 
gravitate towards a neutral vision when I describe and use the theories. Hence, I do not think 
some theories or hypothesis are more reliable than others.  
3.1. Three alternative theories for describing Budget Support effects 
on AC-CSOs.  
3.1.1. Weber and Marginalization 
Max Weber is called the father of sociology. Under his lifetime, 1864-1920, he became the 
most important and influential scientist of what he defined as a science which describes, 
translates and explains social action (Boglind et al, 1981:89). Weber’s work touches on a 
great variety of social actions that describe society. The part of Weber’s science which is 
relevant for this study is his “typology of authority”, a theory on power and authority. 
According to Weber, power (macht) is a situation of a position- and object-relation, where the 
actor who is in a higher position has a possibility to settle his/her will on the actor who is in a 
lower position and thus controls his/her actions. With power comes authority (herrschaft) 
which is the eventual possibility for the actor with a higher position to find obedience and 
compliance from the actor with a lower position on specific demands (Boglind et al, 
1981:100f). Weber describes three ideal typifications for power to be claimed and to be 
subordinated by the power. First, the rational legitimatized ground, where the authority is 
based on beliefs of the legitimacy of a fixed order and the authority of having the right to 
govern to maintain the order from the subordinated. Second, the traditional legitimatized 
ground, where beliefs are lying in the inviolability of traditions and the legitimacy of 
traditional ways of appointing authorities. Third, the charismatic legitimatized ground, where 
societal processes are braked off and transformed in a new way because of beliefs in 
individual persons (Boglind et al, 1981:103f). Here Weber highlights legitimacy of power and 
how it can be implemented. Clearly, power can be maintained in several ways.  
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In the case of Uganda, the GoU’s work tends to be legitimized. The NRM has ruled for 21 
years now without any coups d'état to change the rule. Thus, the power is characterized by the 
subordinate who accepts the role of authority. If we look at how the GoU exercises its power, 
there are tendencies of Civil Society marginalization. In ActionAid’s and CARE’s report 
“Where to now?”, the authors argue that the primary assumption where Budget Support is 
seen as a key to improve transparency and accountability to parliament and institutions, and in 
turn strengthen democratic accountability and Civil Society, is misleading. The GoU tends to 
ignore NGOs’ inputs and recommendations. Thus there is a cooperation failure which is 
characterized by mutual mistrust and suspicion. The NGOs believe they are excluded from 
essential dialogues with donors and the GoU. If the policy process is not open enough for 
non-state actors, one can not call Budget Support a tool for strengthening democratic 
accountability (ActionAid and CARE 1, 2006). Furthermore, the GoU has introduced an NGO 
law, which demands all the NGOs in the country to have been registered. The registration is 
approved or denied depending on the will of the GoU. Thus, NGOs gain less independence 
(Hansen & Twaddle, 1998:149ff).  
 
As Budget Support input is strengthening the power of the state’s institutions, it is also 
strengthening the role of the GoU. The indications of ignorance and domination described 
above may be incidents which can be explained by Weber’s theory of marginalization. The 
GoU receives a more dominant position because of Budget Support and uses the asymmetrical 
power to maintain a higher position of power in the relationship with AC-CSOs. In this 
scenario, donors play a crucial role, not stimulating AC-CSOs enough to maintain the position 
of a strong and active Civil Society actor. If the GoU marginalizes AC-CSOs because of their 
dominant position, donors have failed to uphold the primal demands of Civil Society. Donors 
can also use their power directly to maintain their higher position on AC-CSOs. 
 
Figure 3:1 Weber’s theory of Marginalization 
Budget Support Function of Anti-
Corruption Organizations 
Dominant position 
(Weber) 
-
-
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3.1.2. Norm Socialization Process and the Boomerang Effect 
Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink explore in their anthology “The Power of 
Human Rights” if the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, established in 1948, are 
observed in present time. The editors investigate under what conditions Human Rights 
principles influence state behaviour towards their citizens and under what circumstances 
international human right norms are internalized in domestic work (Risse et al, 1999). The 
anthology does not only focus on the human rights area. The essence of the book is how 
norms are implemented differently in diverse contexts and why. Budget Support and Anti-
Corruption as well as Human Rights principles are examples of norms, drawn up by Western 
international regimes, which other regimes must live up to. Thus, using Risse’s, Ropp’s and 
Sikkink’s ideas to investigate why Budget Support influences AC-CSOs in Uganda as they do 
is a possible step to fulfil the aim of the research.     
 
Risse, Ropp and Sikkink argue that the diffusion of international norms in the Human Rights 
area crucially depends on how networks between domestic and transnational actors are 
established and sustained. The networks can have three purposes; first, to put norm-violating 
states on the international agenda, second, to empower and legitimate claims of domestic 
opposition groups, social movements and NGOs, and third, to challenge norm-violating 
governments by creating transnational pressures on the regimes. This procedure where 
international norms are internalized and implemented domestically is called a norm 
socialization process (Risse et al, 1999:5). The norm socialization process is distinguished in 
three parts; First, the instrumental adaptation to pressure governments, where strategic 
bargaining is essential. The receiving countries are told that norms like for example Budget 
Support and Anti-Corruption are important factors to focus on for receiving more funds from 
the international donor community. Second, the process of an argumentative discourse. Here 
moral conscious-raising, argumentation and persuasion are essential elements to create 
pressure on a deeper level. The first two parts of interaction can together or separately 
develop the norm to the third part of the process, which is institutionalization and 
habitualization of the norm. In this part, there is an acceptance of the validity of the norm and 
there are more engagements in dialogue about the norm-implementation. This can shape 
identities, interests and behaviour that mirror the idea of the norm. 
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Principled ideas/international 
norms 
Adaptation and strategic 
bargaining 
Moral consciousness-raising, 
argumentation, persuasion 
Institutionalization and 
habitualization 
Internalization of norms in 
identities, interests, behaviour             
Figure 3:2.  The process of socialization (Risse et al, 1999:12) 
 
As Budget Support and Anti-Corruption are principle ideas created as international norms, the 
norm socialization process can capture its implementation. If the three steps are successfully 
achieved, Budget Support as well as Anti-Corruption work shall be internalized and accepted 
by the stakeholders, and there shall be more focus on these matters. Consequently, as the 
focus on Anti-corruption work at the same time coincides with Budget Support, AC-CSOs 
should be gaining more attention and support from both donors and the GoU after Budget 
Support implementation. Thus, the underlying cause of such a scenario is the norm 
socialization process. 
 
To go from the theoretical arguments to empirical analysis, the authors have shed light on 
several “boomerang effects” in different phases of norm implementation. A boomerang effect 
is when domestic groups in a repressive state go around their state and directly search out 
international allies to bring pressure on their state from the outside. In this way, domestic and 
transnational groups can pressure the states “from above” and “from below” to accomplish 
transformations. The domestic opposition, social movements and NGOs put direct pressure 
from below and indirect pressure from above, with help from international allies. When 
excluded domestic groups in a repressive state go around their state and search for 
international allies to create pressure from the outside, a boomerang effect has been made 
(Risse et al, 1999:17f).      
     
In this case, if the cooperation or communication does not work between the GoU and AC-
CSOs in Uganda (1st step in figure 3:3), as a result of the more independent distribution of 
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funds to the GoU which Budget Support creates, the AC-CSOs have to work in another 
direction (2nd step). For example, an International Non Governmental Organization (INGO) 
can help and use its international network to put pressure on an aid-giving donors (3rd step). 
The donors can in turn threat with Budget Support withdrawal (4th step), to create a dialogue 
with the GoU (5th step). If this is the case, the Local AC-CSO changes strategy to achieve 
their commitments and they avoid the marginalization.  
 
Budget Support (5) 
GoU (1) Local AC-CSO (2) 
Donors (4) 
-
INGO (3) 
Figure 3:3, a boomerang effect 
 
Consequently, Budget Support marginalizes AC-CSOs but because of a strong international 
network, a boomerang effect can be made which maintains the AC-CSOs position. Thus, the 
existence of strong international networks influences Budget Support effects on AC-CSOs.   
 
Budget Support Function of Anti-
Corruption Organizations 
+/-
High level of strong 
International network 
+
Norm socialization 
process 
Figure 3:4 Norm Socialization Process and Boomerang effect 
 
The norm socialization process and the boomerang effect create a double pressure on the 
GoU. First there is the underlying norm socialization process, where Budget Support and 
Anti-Corruption gain more attention as they are international norms. Second, if the attention is 
missing, a boomerang effect, with help from an international network can change the negative 
effect from Budget Support on AC-CSOs and they can maintain their position. The donors 
have an important role here, as they are the central actor for the change of action. If AC-CSOs 
are gaining more attention after Budget Support implementation, or maintain their position 
because of using boomerang effects, they have a good working relationship with the donors.     
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3.1.3. Patronage and Clientelism   
“Patronage and clientelism” is a broad reaction to the ideas that political development and 
bureaucratic universalism are forms of an evolutionary event made up of Western liberal 
values. Operations of modern institutions are not as simple as those liberal values, which are 
embedded in societies without traditional hierarchical cultures (Roniger & Günes-Ayata, 
1994:3).  
        
The relationship of patronage and clientelism is described as a sort of commitment between 
two actors, where political and economic support and protection from the patron are delivered 
and, in return, the client gives the actor loyalty and different favours (Törnquist, 1996:62). 
This sort of asymmetrical power is combined with solidarity. Even if the client has access to 
power, he does not use it. He is neutralized by the patron’s position. But at the same time, the 
patron’s control is never totally legitimized. He is exposed to be attacked by social forces 
committed to universal principles, forces that are excluded from the clientelistic relations, or 
other competing patrons (Roniger & Günes-Ayata, 1994:4). The patronage is built on a 
vulnerable situation for the client. The patron protects the client and the client must feel the 
support for a sustainable loyalty. He must feel expectation and satisfaction with the protection 
from the patron and a loss of individual needs if the patron closes their relationship. A 
decrease in the client’s vulnerability will lead to a loss of the patron’s control which in turn 
leads to a lack of demand for the patron’s resources and services and a fragility of clientelistic 
commitments (Roniger & Günes-Ayata, 1994:11). Thus, patronage and clientelism is a sort of 
dual commitment, where the hierarchical order is mutually beneficial.        
 
Patronage and clientelistic relationships have always been present in society.  The traditional 
patronage system was a hierarchical commitment, mostly known as the landlord-peasant 
relationship. It was structural, permanent and unquestioned. The modern form of patronage 
system is more equal in its character even if the structure still is unequal in its exchange. The 
client allows the asymmetrical relationship only if it is founded in a communitarian ideology 
and open for the patron. The client can make threats to the patron and sometimes take 
collective actions against him, if he is not effective enough (Roniger & Günes-Ayata, 
1994:23f). Consequently, patronage and clientelism continue to play an important role in 
present time but in a different way. Nowadays, patronage is less effective in controlling 
access to basic productions and economic markets in developed societies than in developing 
societies, even though patronage still is effective in developed countries (Roniger & Günes-
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Ayata, 1994:210f). In a society based on legal principles, it is harder to use a patron/client 
relationship to a greater extent, because forceful and observed laws can prevent the 
patron/client-relationship’s possible radical outcomes. Thus, in developing countries like 
Uganda, where legal principles sometimes are abused, the patron/client-relationships are more 
prevalent in the society than in developed countries.           
 
If there are patron/client relationships in the case of Uganda, the GoU and donors are in most 
cases the patrons, supporting AC-CSOs (clients) for loyalty in return. The GoU is vulnerable 
to forces of universal principles like Human Rights and democracy, or by other actors who are 
not in the relation, for example donors. The AC-CSO feels it is satisfied with the relationship 
with the GoU. Thus, they are loyal. Otherwise, the relationship would be broken. Sometimes 
it is instead the AC-CSO who is patron and the GoU who is client, for example when a strong 
international AC-CSO like Oxfam10 is supporting the GoU in some project. Donors can also 
be the client when strong international AC-CSOs demand issues of their work. Donors are 
also vulnerable of international critics, for example if the aid is bound too strong by 
conditions. If that is the case, the patron/client relationship can be wrecked because of a 
broken loyalty. Thus, the activities by both donors and the GoU can show results of a 
patron/client relationship. 
 
Everything is running as it always has, autonomous of the Budget Support. It is business as 
usual. The underlying bonds are impregnating the society. Thus, Budget Support does not 
have an effect on civil society.  
 
Figure 3:5 Patronage and Clientelism 
Budget 
Support 
+/-
Patron/Client 
relationship 
Function of Anti-
Corruption Organizations 
 
The three alternative theories are summarized in table 3:1 
Theory Causal Mechanism Predicted Result 
Weber’s typology of 
authority 
Marginalization Gain less power  
Risse, Ropp & Sikkinks 
theory of Norm diffusion 
Norm Socialization Process Gain more power  
                                                 
10 Oxfam works with a huge spectrum of issues, among other things Anti-Corruption (Oxfam, 2007).    
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Risse, Ropp & Sikkinks 
theory of Norm diffusion 
The Boomerang Effect Maintained power 
Theory of Patronage & 
Clientelism 
Patronage and Clientelism Maintained power 
Table 3:1 Summary of theories 
3.2. Theories explaining differences within the Civil Society concept 
The term Civil Society is a diffuse and complex term. It can comprise so much or exclude so 
much depending on how one defines it. To be able to answer Research Question two, all 
components must be clearly viewed. Therefore, an outline of the Civil Society debate and an 
integrated description of the context of Africa and Uganda will be introduced here.    
3.2.1 The complexity of Civil Society 
Civil Society is an old concept but it has not been questioned and debated in a sufficient 
manner until recently, when the political liberalisation and democratization in Latin America 
and Eastern Europe took place in the 1980s and early 1990s (Sjögren, 1998:7). In the debate 
today, one can see two different descriptions of the term. Howell and Pearce (2001) call them 
“the mainstream approach” and “the alternative approach”. Sjögren (1998) identify them as 
“liberal traditions” and “Marxist critical traditions”. I prefer to describe them as “the Liberal 
Mainstream View” (LMV) and “the Critical Alternative View” (CAV). 
 
LMV discusses the role of the individual, state and society and bases the idea from the rise of 
capitalism and industrialization. They argue that Civil Society can be a component necessary 
to any society in the process of economical and political transformation as long as the rule of 
law is well-functioning. The conception of Civil Society creates an ethical order for 
capitalism, so that commercial society and capital growth emerge together with social 
development. The sphere is important for reconciliation of differences within a whole modern 
society as well as for inclusion and equality of every group of citizens. Furthermore, Civil 
Society should increase the stock of social capital11. Norms, trust and networking are tools for 
a high degree of social capital which creates a healthy civil society, and in turn a democratic 
state to develop (Howell & Pearce, 2001:17-26). One of LMV’s protagonists, Alexis De 
Tocqueville, defines civil society as follows: 
 
                                                 
11 The idea of social capital is outlined by Robert Putnam in his book “Making Democracy Work”.    
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Three types of virtues are attributed to Civil Society – as a counterweight to state power 
/…/, an institutionally democratising force and finally a sphere for elaborating or 
transforming normative notions of fair systems of governance (Sjögren, 1998:11f)      
 
One can notice that LMV sees Civil Society as an unproblematic component of a democratic 
society, but is this realistic? An alternative group of Civil Society literature, the ACV, has 
emerged because of what they call the deficiencies of the LMV. Basically, the idea is that 
Civil Society is more complex and problematic than what the LMV suggests. ACV 
acknowledges the importance of social differentiations, power and conflict in its conception 
of Civil Society (Howell & Pearce, 2001:32). An historical and materialistic understanding of 
Civil Society, rooted in Hegelian, Marxist and Gramscian ideas, are explored by ACV. They 
argue that the roots of Civil Society are to be found in political economy and it is always 
reshaped, although in an indirect and complex way, through a restructuring in the material 
sphere (Sjögren, 1998:12). Thus a critique of capitalism is embedded in ACV. Gramsci argues 
that Civil Society and the state are embedded in a capitalist system. This system is reproduced 
through hegemony12 and authority within Civil Society and the state. Civil Society is an 
instrument for the ruling class to reproduce the capitalist system through CSOs, so citizens 
become influenced by capitalist norms by the elite (Chambers & Kymlicka, 2002:90f). One 
has to understand that Civil Society looks different in different types of regions and contexts. 
This is often the problem for the writers; they assume that Civil Society organisations are 
similar and that their relations with the states always have the character of a countervailing 
power (Van Roy, 1998:135). ACV is sceptical of LMV’s stress on consensus rather than 
conflict. They reject the homogenisation and sees Civil Society as an agency for social 
change. NGOs are valued by LMV for its links with poor and grassroots organizations and are 
useful for anti-poverty programs. At the same time there are many NGOs who try to hang on 
to their autonomy in order to create a change defined by themselves rather than be used as 
agents for the implementation of donor visions of development (Howell & Pearce, 2001:33ff). 
Thus, there are different types of NGOs or CSOs within Civil Society. Adam Habib 
distinguishes three different blocks, based on Civil Society in South Africa. These blocks 
have different relations to the state and donors. The first is formal service related NGOs, 
which have a partnership with or are subcontracted to by the state. These organizations have a 
more engaged and collegial relation to the state. Often they provide services that the state is 
supposed to deliver. In opposition of service delivery organizations are critical organizations 
                                                 
12 Hegemony is a position of supremacy where the power not necessarily has to be violent.  
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with grounds from social movements who actively challenge neo-liberal structures. Their 
relationship with the state is more controversial. They are engaging the state in an attempt to 
persuade it through lobbying, court action or even resistance. They act as a sort of watchdog, 
watching that the state is behaving in a fair and democratic way. In between these types of 
organizations is situated a third type; the informal survivalist organization, mainly in 
marginalized communities. They assist people in trying to survive the ravages of neo-
liberalism. They receive no resources or recognition from the state (Habib, 2005:9).       
 
In the case of Africa and Uganda, much of the literature on the African Civil Societies is 
pessimistic over the focus on Western ideals. Africa is a good example of the deficiencies of 
LMV’s homogenization of the Civil Society concept. For example, the Western assumption 
that Civil Society is above all a countervailing power to the state does not fit in to the African 
society. Political resources are often not fairly distributed and the boundaries between state 
and Civil Society often blur in to each other. One must see how the state uses the civic sphere 
and civic institutions as vehicles for its hegemonic project, shrinking sectors of Civil Society 
that do not fit their interests. As a matter of fact, much of the weakness in Civil Society 
organisations in Africa has to do with the states active role in fragmenting those they distrust. 
Informal CBOs are often ignored by the state. Furthermore, Civil Society in Africa is often 
severely restricted by registrations of society laws, made by the state for their hegemonic 
project (Van Roy, 1998:134ff).  
 
The Civil Society of Uganda has been and still is fragile and weak. During the colonial years, 
NGOs were only active in humanitarian and missionary fields. Under the dictatorship of Idi 
Amin most of the organizations fled the country because of brutal repression, but after the 
overthrow of Amin the NGOs came back, focusing on disaster relief (Hansen & Twaddle, 
1998:147). The years to come were strongly affected by guerrilla war and civil war until 
Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM) took over power in 1986. In 
this time, only a reduced form of Civil Society emerged, much weaker than other parts of East 
Africa (Brock et al, 2004:56). With this background, one can understand that the context has 
undermined the development of strong independent organizations. But in recent years the 
number of NGOs has increased tremendously in Uganda. Over 700 organizations are now 
registered in the country. But the reason for the increase is the reawakened interest from 
foreign donors rather than an emergence of political stability (Hansen & Twaddle, 1998:147). 
Improvements have been made but the state of Uganda is still fragile. The power depends on 
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well resourced repressive equipments and access to foreign resources (Brock et al, 2004:62). 
The GoU is aware of the situation and has been courting the donor community for decades 
which has resulted in a good relationship, high availability of funds and high levels of trust. 
But the GoU is still dependent on service delivery NGOs because they perform duties that the 
government does not have the capacity to do. Thus the government gains legitimacy from 
service delivery NGOs. The weakness has generally generated a situation where donors 
demand Civil Society to hold the government accountable for democratic ideals. This shows 
that Civil Society is going from a service delivery role to a watchdog function in a stronger 
manner than before. Advocacy work and evaluation has been more common. But this progress 
also reflects the power of the donor community. NGOs depend on their donors and they tend 
to be more accountable to them than to their own local people. Projects have a tendency to 
concentrate on efforts which generate quick results for the donors (Hansen & Twaddle, 
1998:153f).                          
The relation between the GoU and Civil Society in Uganda is still problematic. NGOs tend to 
be tolerated as long as they continue to function in an apolitical and non-confrontational way. 
The major way of controlling the NGOs is through the NGO registration board, established in 
1989. The board registers, monitors and guides the activities of the organizations. The 
organizations’ applications can be rejected by the board and thus the NGOs gain less 
autonomy. Some NGOs prefer to remain apolitical and non-confrontational and not adopt an 
advocacy role (Hansen & Twaddle, 1998:149ff). The registration act has been developed in 
recent years. In 2001, registration of NGOs was introduced for the parliament as a bill to 
become a law. This law was established as an act of parliament on the 7th of April 2006, the 
NGO Act. The act is seen by many NGOs as a way for the regime to consolidate their power 
over them (Uganda National NGO Forum1, 2006).  
 
One thing that can be outlined here is the diversities of organizations in Uganda. Over 700 
organizations are registered, including “service delivery” organizations and “watchdog” 
organizations, as well as other types of organizations. The GoU may like some types of 
organizations better than others. For example, as they are in need of having organizations with 
the service delivery function, they might prefer their existence before others and therefore 
promote and help their work more accurately. As Budget Support is a tool which gives the 
authority of distribution to the GoU, there may be certain organizations that have a better 
chance to receive funds than others. Also donors may prefer certain organizations more than 
others, for example advocacy organizations may be preferable because there is an 
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international consensus for supporting advocacy issues. Thus, Budget Support influence on 
AC-CSOs may give different results if the integrated factor of organization differences is 
included:        
 
Figure 3:6 Differentiation effects 
Function of Anti-
Corruption Organizations 
Type of organization 
Budget Support 
The theories of Civil Society are summarized in table 3:2: 
Theory Describing Mechanism Predicted Result 
Liberal Mainstream View  Homogenization  No differences 
Alternative Critical View Heterogenization  Differences 
Table 3:2 Summaries of Civil Society theories  
4.  Exploring the effects of Budget Support implementation: 
4.1. AC-CSOs’ relation to Donors and the GoU 
According to the literature review above, the question about what effects Budget Support has 
on Anti-Corruption Organizations in Uganda can take four different answers: a) Either Anti-
Corruption Organizations have gained less power since Budget Support was implemented, 
based on weberian ideals; or b) Anti-Corruption Organizations have gained more power, 
based on ideals of the norm socialization process; or c) Anti-Corruption Organizations have 
maintained their power, based on ideals of the boomerang effect; or d) Anti-Corruption 
Organizations have maintained their power, based on patron/client ideals.) .   
 
To reach an answer on the effects, I measure AC-CSOs’ relation to Donors and the GoU. 
More specifically, I measure how the relations between them have changed since Budget 
Support was implemented. Generally, I investigate the changes over the past 5 years, because 
the first full Budget Support implementation was made in Uganda in 2001. There are several 
ways to measure the effects, but there are four indicators in this essay which are used for this 
purpose; 
• Funds: The financial input is an element to see how interested donors and the GoU 
are in the relationship with AC-CSOs. If the financial inputs have increased, it 
indicates a stronger relationship and vice versa.  
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• Gain a hearing: To make a voice and get feedback of that voice is important in a 
good working relationship. If donors and the GoU listen to issues from AC-CSOs and 
respond actively on the issues, there is a tendency of a stronger relationship, and vice 
versa. 
• Transparency: A transparent working environment is essential for an effective 
working result. If the procedure of the work between AC-CSOs and donors and the 
GoU are relatively clear, and if donors and the GoU do not intend to slow down the 
process of AC-CSOs’ work, it indicates a stronger relationship, and vice versa.  
• Independence: A free and autonomous relationship with respect to the other part as a 
sovereign is important if the work shall be effective. If AC-CSOs are bound to donors 
and the GoU’s ideas and can not express their own values, it indicates a weaker 
relationship, and vice versa.  
4.2. Differences between Civil Society Organizations 
 
If the study finds that Budget Support has had effects on Anti-Corruption organisations, the 
next question to answer is whether the effects from Budget Support are similar for different 
types of Anti-Corruption Organizations in Uganda. The theories previously mentioned argue 
either that: a) Effects of Budget Support are diverse for different types of organizations, based 
on the Alternative Critical View13, i.e. that effects of Budget Support are diverse between 
watchdog- and service delivery organizations; or b) that effects of Budget Support are not 
diverse for different types of organizations, based on the liberal mainstream view.    
 
The organizations have a great variety in structure, design, history, etc. This may be important 
when it comes to the relationship with the GoU and donors. Differences can be investigated 
on many indicators, for example differences in years of operation or if the organization is 
rural or urban. But I have chosen to focus on a structure related indicator; if there are 
differences between Watchdog Organizations and Service Delivery Organizations, based on 
Adam Habib’s theory of Civil Society.14     
 
Watchdog Organizations, which mainly work with advocacy and evaluation issues, might be 
more uncomfortable for the GoU than Service Delivery Organizations, because these issues 
hold the GoU accountable. The GoU has to uphold ideals based on democracy, Human 
                                                 
13 Hypotheses 5.1 is further explained in 5.2, p 23 
14 As no Informal Survivalist Organization was interviewed, that category is removed from the study.  
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Rights, Anti-Corruption etc. At the same time, advocacy and evaluation are requested by the 
donor community. These issues are important for donors in order to uphold an effective 
funding mechanism. Therefore, the probability is stronger that Watchdog Organizations tend 
to be more marginalized by the GoU than Service Delivery Organizations, whereas the 
probability is weaker that Watchdog Organizations tend to be more marginalized by donors 
than Service Delivery Organizations. Instead, the probability is stronger that Watchdog 
Organizations tend to be more strengthened by donors than Service Delivery Organizations.   
4.3. Analysing the observed effects 
 
Finally this study looks at the reasons behind changes in the work of Anti-Corruption 
organisations, given that Budget Support has had effects on Civil Society. According to the 
theories presented above, the answers can take the following forms: a) Anti-Corruption 
Organizations are marginalized, following Weberian ideals; b) they are increasingly 
strengthened, following the norm socialization process; c) they are using a boomerang effect 
with help from their international network, and have maintained their strength; or d) they are 
tied to a patron/client relationship and are not influenced. 
 
5. Method 
5.1. Study design 
In order to discover effects from Budget Support implementation on AC-CSOs, a number of 
methods can be used. One way is to use a qualitative text analysis, focusing on documents 
from AC-CSOs, donors or the GoU. Another way is to do a quantitative study. However, 
there is lack of data for the specific subject. Effects due to the implementation of Budget 
Support are hard to measure in statistical terms. The only way would be through a survey 
approach to collect the data. But as the research questions of this thesis are investigating 
effects and why the effects have occurred, both methods are deficient. To go beyond the 
measured results, one has to interact with people and their opinions. So the best alternative is 
a qualitative method where interviews with actors from AC-CSOs in Uganda are used. This 
method is the best way to capture the core of the investigation, namely the transformation. It 
can partly be investigated with documents, for example if an organization has received fewer 
funds since the Budget Support implementation. But the personal opinions of the 
transformation will be missed. With interviews, “the transformation factor” is easier to 
capture. 
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 The outline of the case-study will be disposed by tracking down the role of the Anti-
Corruption Organizations’ work, evaluating the result with the hypotheses. I will compare the 
role of AC-CSOs before and after the implementation. It can be carried out in two ways, 
either by asking relevant actors about the past or by building up points of comparison based 
on literature about politics in Uganda, to understand the role of AC-CSOs before the Budget 
Support implementation. Thus, the study consists of two analytical time-observations of one 
occasion and therefore it is not a pure case-study based on one observation of one occasion. 
But the study is still carried out in only one context, so it can not be referred to as a 
comparative study (Esaiasson et al, 2004:119f). A comparative study could have been used, 
comparing the successful case of Budget Support in Uganda with an unsuccessful case, for 
example Malawi15, in order to se how differences are shaped in Civil Society because of 
variations in the independent variable. However, I did not have enough financial resources to 
do that. It can also be difficult to find enough relevant interview objects from both the 
successful and unsuccessful cases to make a generalizing result. So the best alternative is a 
case study. This study thus does not have the aim of generalizing empirical findings because it 
is a case study. However, there might be some lessons to learn, especially concerning the 
question on whether the structure of Budget Support is sustainable in the African context.     
 
In order to obtain research material, I interview central actors in the Civil Society who work 
against corruption in Uganda. I exercise informant interviews to use the persons as observers 
over how the reality of the problem described above is disposed (Esaiasson et al, 2004:253f).  
5.2. Sampling 
The population of the thesis is AC-CSOs in Uganda. To investigate the population, strategic 
samples were used. Random samples are normally exercised when you want to analyse a large 
number of units. Uganda has not enough AC-CSOs for random samples to be useful. To use 
strategic samples, one must specify and intensify the samples so that the objects interviewed 
have the right backgrounds to measure the effects (Esaiasson et al, 2004:288). The first step 
was to map out the organizations. I started with outlining the members of the Anti Corruption 
Coalition of Uganda (ACCU), which include 50 Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) that are 
unified to effectively work against corruption. Here, I could have intensified the sampling by 
only using pure AC-CSOs. But as my second research question wants to see the varieties of 
                                                 
15 See the report Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support 1994 – 2004 by IDD et al (2006) 
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Budget Support effects in different types of organizations, I choose not to intensify the 
samples further. Instead I use the “snow-ball method”16 to outline a larger variety of types of 
organizations, related to Anti-Corruption work.  
5.3. The interviews 
The material findings were obtained during a field trip during almost two months mainly 
spent in Kampala, Uganda. The fieldtrip was financed by a Minor Field Study (MFS) 
Scholarship. Altogether I made 16 interviews with AC-CSOs. I also collected some 
documents and other valuable sources of data during this time.  
The confidentiality aspect was problematic for this thesis. There is a conflict between the 
demand for confidentiality and a control of inter-subjectivity (Kvale, 1998:110). Some 
respondents demanded confidentiality, which is why their names have been left out. I can still, 
however, categorize different types of organizations and therefore also answer research 
question two.  
5.4. The interview guide 
An interview guide of high-quality is founded in theory and has both thematic and dynamic 
dimensions. Thematic in the way it relates to the subject, dynamic in the way it interacts with 
the respondent (Kvale, 1998:121f). I was trying to capture this dual dimension. The dynamic 
dimension with the specific questions used in the interviews links back to the thematic 
questions created from theory, illustrated in table 6:117. 
Theoretic Dimension Thematic Dimension Dynamic Dimension 
- Marginalization 
 
- Norm Socialization 
Process 
 
- Boomerang Effect 
 
- Patronage and 
Clientelism 
1) Relation to Budget   
Support? 
2) Relation to Donors?  
3) Relation to the GoU? 
4) Relation between 
Donors, the GoU and AC-
CSOs? 
5) Level of International 
Network? 
1) Is BS a positive or a negative initiative for 
AC-CSOs in Uganda? 
2) Has donor funding risen or fallen over the 
past 5 years? 
3) Is it easier or more difficult to deal with the 
GoU today than 5 years ago? 
4) Do AC-CSOs have influence over the 
agenda with Donors and the GoU? 
5) Does your organization have international 
actors who help you in your work? 
 Table 6:1 Dimension of Interviews 
                                                 
16 A snow-ball method is when an informant/respondent points out another informant/respondent and so on 
(Esaiasson et al, 2004:286) 
17 The numbers in table 6:1 show the relation between the thematic- and dynamic dimensions. The questions in 
the dynamic dimensions are only examples. The interview guide with all questions used is shown in appendix  
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The questions in the thesis are partly inspired by questions from the report “Where to now?” 
by ActionAid and Care International (2006). In the end of the interviews, I always made space 
for the respondent to add something which he/she felt was important to highlight.     
 
5.5. Delimitations 
In Research Question two, only Weber’s theory of marginalization and the Norm 
Socialization Process were used, leaving the theories of the Boomerang Effect and 
Patron/Client out of it. There was no space for using all theories and the interviewed 
organizations applied on the Boomerang Effect and Patron/Client theories turned out to be too 
few. Also, there was no organization who applied the Norm Socialization Process with the 
GoU, so that part was left out as well. Furthermore, Adam Habib’s three block theory was 
used, but Informal Survivalist Organizations (CBOs) was left out because I did not manage to 
make interviews with such organizations during my fieldtrip. However, Watchdog- and 
Service Delivery Organizations were the important indicators to answer Research Question 
two because of their polarized positions.    
 
6. Empirical findings and analysis 
6.1. Organization 1 (Watchdog) 
 Donors Government 
Funds + Not existing 
Gain a Hearing +/- +/- 
Transparency +/- - 
Independence - - 
We can see two different tendencies for O1 in their relation to donors and the GoU. First, 
donors are increasingly pumping in money but O1 becomes more dependent in return. The 
donors’ increased awareness of Anti-Corruption has helped O1. It is a strategic way to 
implement the international norm focused on “Anti-Corruption”. Thus, O1 is embedded in the 
second part of the donors’ norm socialization process using argumentation and persuasion to 
implement the norms. However, even if O1 normally are invited to paternal meetings between 
the GoU, Civil Society and Donors, they are not given participation on the same level as 
donors and the GoU. Donors want to implement their own ideas on O1’s work which 
influence their space of independence negatively. Second, the GoU has made the relationship 
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with O1 more problematic since the Budget Support implementation. The NGO law and their 
hostile attitude is a way of marginalizing O1. They are in a position and object relationship 
with the GoU, following Weber’s theory.       
7.2. Organization 2 (Watchdog) 
 Donors Government 
Funds - Not existing 
Gain a Hearing +/- +/- 
Transparency - - 
Independence + + 
O2 is gaining its independence at the cost of lower level of funds. O2 drive their own agenda 
with both donors’ and the GoU, but as donors’ focus has change from dept relief to other 
areas and O2’s initial focus was debt relief, they gain less funds.  Moreover O2 find it hard to 
cooperate with both the GoU and donors. The transparency and attention by donors and the 
GoU on O2 are problematic. O2 is invited to parternal meetings but both donors and the GoU 
use strategies which delay and complicate O2’s participation, especially when they are 
negotiating loans. For example, sometimes O2 is given information on the agenda for a 
meeting too late, so O2 cannot commission their own independent research and inform their 
position and views. This creates a situation where donors’ and the GoU have taken a more 
dominant position. Thus, O2 is marginalized by the GoU and donors, following Weber’s 
theory of position and object relationship. 
7.3. Organization 3 (Watchdog) 
 Donors Government 
Funds + Not existing 
Gain a Hearing + + 
Transparency +/- - 
Independence + - 
O3 has gained less power in their relation with the GoU since BS implementation. They are 
given space and opportunities by the GoU and at the same time the GoU work against O3. If 
they are crossing some lines, for example if they highlight a sensitive question of corruption, 
they are threatened or even killed. This oppression leads to a marginalized relationship to the 
GoU, following Weber’s ideals of position and object relation. O3 has gained more power in 
their relation to donors since BS implantation, even though the competition of funds is hard 
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and donors are too hasty to get results. O3 has extended its positive reputation on an 
international level and the funding is four to five times higher than five years ago. As 03 is a 
pure Anti-Corruption organization and this directionality has focused from the international 
community, there is a tendency of acceptance of the norm. Thus, O3 is in the third part of a 
norm socialization process.  
7.4. Organization 4 (Service Delivery) 
 Donors Government 
Funds - Not existing 
Gain a Hearing +/- - 
Transparency - - 
Independence - - 
O4 has been more marginalized by both donors and the GoU since BS implementation in all 
the indicators that are used in this thesis. The funding from donors has significantly fallen as 
the focus has turned to conflict prevention, which is O4’s directionality. It is a serious 
problem for O4 as they are very dependent on donor funding. O4 play a periphery role in the 
whole partnership with the GoU and donors. They are called partners but when it comes to 
major issues, they find Civil Society standing at the very extreme end O4 is therefore a clear 
case of an actor in a lower position being used by stronger actors so that they can remain in 
power. O4 mentioned this quite clearly: “I think it is a political issue really, the current government has 
stayed in power for so long so they are using all the tactics to continue survive in power…” 
7.5. Organization 5 (Watchdog) 
 Donors Government 
Funds + Not existing 
Gain a Hearing +/- +/- 
Transparency - + 
Independence +/- No answer 
O5 see their relation with donors and the GoU as positive, but at the same time they are 
working in line with their policies. Funding has increasingly risen for O5 since BS 
implementation and they are invited to important meetings between Civil Society, the GoU 
and donors in their district. But O5 cannot participate on the same permits because their lack 
of capacity and the fact that donors are holding the carrot when it comes to interest-areas and 
procedures on different issues. O5 believe they are more independent from donors than before 
BS implementation but at the same time their focus has changed in the same direction as the 
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international community. Thus they are in line with donors’ interests. Consequently, as they 
are a rural organization and do not have an international network to build capacity on, they 
tend to be the client in a patron/client relationship. 
7.6. Organization 6 (Watchdog) 
 Donors Government 
Funds + Not existing 
Gain a Hearing +/- - 
Transparency - - 
Independence - - 
Because O6  have changed strategy to be  in line with the international community’s policies, 
the funds have risen As O6 are a national network and represent many people of Uganda, they 
are invited to attend important meetings with donors and the GoU. But they do not influence 
the agenda. The GoU does not believe in AC-CSO’s ability and they think they are corrupt 
themselves. So O6 must be careful of what they say to the GoU at these meetings. Both 
donors and the GoU are difficult to deal with for O6 and BS has made this even worse. Civil 
Society worry over BS implementation because their achieving terms are very restrictive and 
difficult. O6 believe the GoU was listening to them and the grassroots five years ago but 
nowadays they ignore them. O6 has been marginalized by the GoU because of its advocacy 
role. The marginalization has increased since BS implementation because of among other 
things the NGO amendment act. This follows Weber’s theory that the GoU uses its higher 
position to control O6. Furthermore, O6 is following the donors’ strategies and is therefore 
more funded than before. But O6 has problems with donors shifting focus. Thus O6 is in the 
second part of a norm socialization process, where argumentation and persuasion is made by   
donors to implement their norms. BS has made O6 even more dependent on donors because 
the restrictiveness of accessing these funds.    
7.7. Organization 7 (Watchdog) 
 Donors Government 
Funds - Not existing 
Gain a Hearing + +/- 
Transparency +/- - 
Independence +/- - 
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An unstable political environment, where the GoU changed the constitution, created a  
situation where donors pulled out. When BS was introduced, O7 did not get support from the 
GoU anymore. These two events have made the funding decrease for O7.  
O7 participate and influence actively in local meetings with the GoU and Donors. They are 
“recognised as partners in the stabilization of democracy by the GoU”. But at the national level, the GoU 
is not participating so much. The NGO law has troubled the work for O7. The GoU has been 
very restrictive and bureaucratic in their relation to O7. O7 is worried about the rule of the 
country which becomes more dependent on the power of the President. The system is slowly 
sliding to “a strong man state”. Higher demands have made O7 more dependent on donor 
activities. But as O7 focuses on Anti-Corruption and monitoring, they are in line with donor 
issues. 
BS tends to have badly affected O7, especially with the GoU, which has taken the opportunity 
to marginalize O7, following Weber’s idea of position and object relation. The transformation 
towards a strong man state can be applicable of Weber’s theory that authority is based on 
traditional ways to govern. And as Uganda in the past has had experience of dictatorship, it is 
easier for the President to get away with these actions. As O7 is in line with donor ideals, they 
have a communicative relation even if the support has declined. Thus, it is in the third part of 
the Norm Social Process, where there is an acceptance of the donor norms.    
7.8. Organization 8 (Service Delivery) 
 Donors Government 
Funds + Not existing 
Gain a Hearing - - 
Transparency +/- - 
Independence - - 
Funds have risen over the past five years for O8, but it is shifting over time and O8 do not 
think BS has had effects on these matters. There are no real forums that bring together 
Donors, the GoU and O8. Each donor has its own arrangements on how they want to have it.  
Donors are marginalizing O8. They give the GoU 5-10 years contracts while O8 get 1-2 years. 
Donors prefer LNGOs rather than O8. The GoU is also marginalizing O8 with the NGO law 
among other things. Donors and the GoU do not have a forum to engage with O8. Thus, 
donors and the GoU use their higher position to demand their ideas of action on O8, based on 
Weber’s theory. The President uses his power to secure his authority and that lies in the 
tradition. According to Weber’s second ideal type, authority is based on traditional ways 
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when it comes to appointing and accepting a leader. This tends to be the case in Uganda, 
according to O8, as President Museveni uses an undemocratic and repressive attitude and gets 
away with it. The troubled history of Uganda with dictatorship and civil war can be an 
explanation for why he can govern as he does. It lies in the tradition. 
7.9. Organization 9 (Watchdog) 
 Donors Government 
Funds - Not existing 
Gain a Hearing - - 
Transparency - - 
Independence +/- +/- 
As donors believe the 2006 election was not democratic, some of them have decreased their 
funding and O9 is affected by that. 09 is invited to parternal meetings with the GoU and 
donors, but they are not interested in the people of the grassroots and consequently not 
interested in O9. As the donors are not interested in 09’s focus on women and gender, they 
have a difficult relationship. That is also the case with the GoU because of the NGO law. The 
donors that still are available for O9 are few. That makes O9 vary dependent on them. But 
they believe they still are positioning themselves.      
O9 has not a transparent or a participative relationship with neither donor nor the GoU. They 
gain less attention since BS implementation. Thus it is a tendency of marginalization. Their 
ignorance can be explained by Weber’s position and object theory.    
7.10. Organization 10 (Watchdog) 
 Donors Government 
Funds + Not existing 
Gain a Hearing + - 
Transparency +/- - 
Independence +/- - 
Because of effective and successful work, there has been an increase in projects for O10 and 
consequently an increase in donor funding. When it comes to the level of influence, the GoU 
gives no space. They are increasingly dismissive of NGOs. O10 gives the example that there 
is a board regulating the NGO sector where there is no representation from the NGOs. O10 
expresses difficulties in dealing with donors, because of BS, as certain funds are not available 
directly to NGOs as the case was before. But basket funding has also helped them to gain 
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support for their strategic plan. It is a more independent distribution. But O10 still has 
difficulties in dealing with the GoU, because they are keen to work with service delivery 
NGOs rather than advocacy NGOs and the NGO law narrows the space. The NGO law also 
makes O10 more dependent on the GoU. So O10 has a good relationship with donors on 
many levels, even if they face some difficulties. Human Rights is a focus in line with donors’ 
ideals, even though some difficulties are visual. So there is a tendency of a norm socialization 
process, but there are some disagreements in the relationship. Thus, O10 is in the second part 
of the process, they know that their norms are important and that their relationship reaches an 
argumentative level,. Their relation with the GoU is bad. They act repressively, ignore them 
in meetings and control them with the NGO law. Thus there is a form of marginalization.     
7.11. Organization 11 (Watchdog) 
 Donors Government 
Funds + Not existing 
Gain a Hearing +/- - 
Transparency + - 
Independence + - 
O11 has a close relationship with their donor. The funds have consistently risen because of an 
increase in activities and programs for O11. O11’s attention on corruption is not answered by 
the GoU. O11 can generally speak with donors, but O11 believe they are a part of the GoU’s 
marginalisation of NGOs because they do not react against it. O11 believe donors are easy to 
work with and that it really depends on the quality work by the organizations. But O11 do not 
think that their relation with the GoU is transparent, especially if O11 is pushing a different 
agenda contrary to that of the GoU. O11 is a strong organization and implements activities 
based on their own principles. O11 sets the agenda of activities. Thus they are relatively 
independent of donors. O11 implements ideas from donors on LNGOs. But O11 has a 
relatively dependent relationship with the GoU, because the NGO law controls them. 
Consequently, O11 are within the norm socialization process with the donors, where norms 
are adapted at the local level, a step towards institutionalization. The GoU’s lack of 
transparency and pushing with the NGO law creates a marginalized relationship with O11, 
based on Weber’s ideals. 
7.12. Organization 12 (Watchdog) 
 Donors Government 
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Funds +/- Not existing 
Gain a Hearing + + 
Transparency +/- +/- 
Independence + +/- 
O12 is a big international organization which has had a temporary income decline but funds 
for humanitarian work has always been on a high level.  As O12 is a strong international actor 
they gain a hearing from both donors and the GoU. Sometimes they are donors themselves. 
The relationship with the GoU used to be transparent but it has had some difficulties lately 
because the GoU thought O12 was interfering too much. O12’s big capacity makes them 
independent from donors in their distribution. But the NGO Act makes their relationship with 
the GoU more dependent. However, O12’s international confederation office in New York 
mark positions for the local office in Uganda, and put pressure on the GoU if necessary. Thus, 
boomerang effects are used to maintain their position. 
The conclusion must be that O12 is in the third part of a norm socialization process. There is 
an acceptance of the norms and there are more engagements about how to implement. O12 is 
such a strong actor, so when they speak, the GoU listens. There have been some difficulties in 
their relationship, but they use a boomerang effect with help from international partners, so 
they cannot be marginalized by BS like other AC-CSOs. Or as they put it themselves; “O12 is 
not affected by BS, we are too big”.  
7.13. Organization 13 (Service Delivery) 
 Donors Government 
Funds +/- Not existing 
Gain a Hearing +/- +/- 
Transparency - - 
Independence - - 
Funding from donors to O13 has remained on the same level over the past five years. Not 
every donor did join the BS initiatives and some of them support O13s work. So direct BS has 
not had much impact on O13’s level of funding. O13 is invited to a number of committees but 
they are not as participative in actions as donors and the GoU are. They listen but do not take 
action in most cases. Dealing with donors has become increasingly difficult for O13. Donors’ 
transaction costs are too high in the case of dealing with small organizations and there is a 
tendency that big organizations take advantages of that.  O13 believe the NGO law is a threat 
to their relationship with the GoU. O13 is concerned about a more dependent situation with 
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the GoU because of donors’ new focus. They believe BS only is a good initiative for 
organizations with several donors, but it is not good for organizations that are dependent on 
the same donor. Both donors and the GoU have used the BS mechanism to marginalize O13. 
Thus, they use their higher position on O13, who is in a lower position, based on Weber’s 
theory.    
7.14. Organization 14 (Watchdog) 
 Donors Government 
Funds - Not existing 
Gain a Hearing +/- - 
Transparency - - 
Independence - - 
Global dimensions makes donors shift focus, for example the focus on the crisis in Darfur. 
Because of the shifted focus, the funding to O14 has declined. O14 is not invited to parternal 
meetings with both the GoU and donors but donors sometimes invite them themselves. The 
shift to BS has made it easier for donors to work at the cost of AC-CSOs, as they only have to 
look after one stakeholder (GoU). It is more transparent for donors but not for AC-CSOs. The 
relation with the GoU is also increasingly problematic because of the new political system 
with political parties. Before 2006, it was one political movement. Now there are several 
political parties. When O14 raise an issue, they believe that people think they are against the 
GoU. As BS increases the GoU’s power of distribution, they use the political system as a tool 
to make the relation to O14 more problematic. 
As BS is distributed directly to the GoU, donors often say that O14 should go to the GoU for 
money. So O14 is dependent on a donor who wants to gain them independence from the GoU.  
And O14 is not independent from the GoU. If an organization provides services it is not a 
problem, but as an advocacy organization it is difficult. ” You can’t easily bite the hand that feeds 
you”. 
Consequently, O14 is marginalized by both donors and the GoU, following Weber’s theory of 
position and object relations.   
7.15. Organization 15 (Service Delivery) 
 Donors Government 
Funds - Not existing 
Gain a Hearing - + 
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Transparency - - 
Independence - - 
Half of O15’s budget has fallen this year as donors have changed focus. In contrast to other 
AC-CSOs, O15 sometimes gets attention from the GoU and they were invited to conferences 
concerning water and sanitation. The GoU asked O15 to give them their view because O15 
know the grassroots. But donors do not seem to be interested in conversing with O15 so much 
and BS makes it harder for O15 to access funding because donors prepare for basket funding 
and consequently they cannot give answers about future funding. Also, the multiparty system 
makes it harder for O15 to deal with the GoU, because if they go against the GoU, they are 
seen as a political organization, supporting the opposition. O15 is one of the most donor-
dependent organizations in this study. They only have one single funder. And as they have 
changed their focus to education, it risks the whole existence of O15. The GoU also has a 
tightened grip on O15 with the help of the NGO law. O15 say that they have to get permission 
from the GoU before they take their positions. So O15 is marginalized by both donors and the 
GoU, even though O15 has a better relationship with the GoU than with the donors. 
7.16. Organization 16 (Service Delivery) 
 Donors Government 
Funds + Not existing 
Gain a Hearing + + 
Transparency + + 
Independence +/- +/- 
O16 has almost doubled their budget since last year and has consistently risen over the past 
five years because they have developed a strategy based on reputation, commitment, open 
monitoring and focus on attractive areas. O16 is often invited to meetings with donors and the 
GoU and increasingly gain a hearing. The reason is that they are stakeholders and have been 
around for a long time. O16 also thinks it is easy to deal with donors and see no differences 
since BS implementation. Furthermore, O16 argues that it is mostly up to AC-CSOs 
themselves to create a good working relationship with the GoU and donors. O16’s 
relationship with donors and the GoU can be seen as independent and transparent because 
they work closely together, but one can also say that they are dependent because they are so 
bound to the GoU and donor activities. They do not set their own agenda. They mostly do 
service delivery work. If they were acting more as a watchdog, the relationship might not 
 35
have been so good. Consequently, one cannot say that the have become more or less 
dependent, but they have created a transparent relationship.   
 But there are tendencies that O16 is a part of a patron/ client relationship, where O16 is the 
client and donors and the GoU are patrons.    
 
7. Conclusions 
In this last section, I answer the research questions and connect the results to the overall 
discussion, concluding if Budget Support is sustainable in Uganda. One thing of great 
importance is that the conclusions are based on tendencies. However, the results generate a 
deeper knowledge of the Budget Support implementation and the effects on AC-CSOs.  
7.1. What effects does Budget Support have on Anti-Corruption 
Organizations in Uganda?   
The analysis shows problematic consequences of Budget Support implementation on AC-
CSOs, especially the relation between the GoU and AC-CSOs.  
 
Thirteen out of sixteen AC-CSOs show tendencies of marginalization by the GoU. Thus, there 
is a strong tendency that AC-CSOs gained less power since Budget Support was 
implemented, based on Weberian ideals. As the distribution goes directly to the GoU, they 
receive more power and in turn they marginalize AC-CSOs. This is shown through the NGO 
law, their lack of transparency and their repressive attitude towards AC-CSOs and their 
actions. Many quotes from the interviews demonstrate great problems with the relationship, 
for example dependence, death threats and murder. Thus, the GoU undermines the idea of 
Budget Support. The picture that emerges is that since Budget Support was implemented, 
Anti-Corruption Organizations have gained less power. The GoU uses its extended power to 
settle their will on actors with a lower position (AC-CSOs) based on Weber’s theory. It has 
hence been shown that AC-CSOs have not maintained or gained more power through either 
norm socialization, the boomerang effect, or patron/client theories since budget support was 
implemented.   
 
The tendencies are not strong if we look at the relation to donors. Seven out of sixteen AC-
CSOs show tendencies of gaining less power. Thus, they tend to be marginalized by donors 
while an equal number of AC-CSOs show tendencies of gainig more power, being in a norm 
socialization process. Hence, the probability is stronger that donors marginalize AC-CSOs, 
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based on Weber’s theory, or use them in norm socialization processes rather than being in a 
patron/client relationship or AC-CSOs using boomerang effects on donors, according to the 
results.    
7.2. Are the effects from Budget Support similar for different types 
of Anti-Corruption Organizations in Uganda? 
There are no strong differences in the results of whether the AC-CSO is a Watchdog- or a 
Service Delivery Organization. Both types tend to be strongly marginalized by the GoU. 
Thus, the results show that the hypothesis that Watchdog Organizations tend to be more 
marginalized than Service Delivery Organizations by the GoU does not hold. 
Type of org. 
(16 in total) 
Marginalized 
by Government
Not Marginalized 
by Government 
Watchdog (11) 9 2 
Service Del.  (5) 4 1 
Table 8:1 GoU effects of Marginalization   
The results do not show a tendency of differences within Civil Society and the idea of 
heterogenization by the Alternative Critical View is given a weaker credibility.  
Type of org. 
(16 in total) 
Marginalized 
by Donors 
Not Marginalized 
by Donors 
Watchdog (11) 3  8 
Service Del.  (5) 4 1 
Table 8:2 Donors effects of Marginalization 
There are differences in AC-CSOs’ relation to donors. Eight out of eleven Watchdog 
Organizations do not tend to be marginalized while four out of five Service Delivery 
Organizations tend to be marginalized. Thus, the results show that there is an increased 
probability that Service Delivery Organizations tend to be more marginalized by donors than 
Watchdog Organizations. The results show a tendency of differences within Civil Society and 
thus the idea of heterogenization by the Alternative Critical View is given stronger credibility 
than before. 
Type of org. 
(16 in total) 
Strengthened 
by Donors 
Not Strengthened 
by Donors 
Watchdog (11) 7 4 
Service Del.  (5) 0 5 
Table 8:3 Donors effects of Norm Socialization Process 
Moreover, seven out of eleven Watchdog Organizations tend to be in a Norm Socialization 
Process, while not one Service Delivery Organization tends to be in such a process. Clearly, 
there is a tendency that Watchdog Organizations more easily than Service Delivery 
Organizations adapt the norms created by donors and then implement them to transform 
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Ugandan society. Of course, Watchdog Organizations like Human Rights Organizations and 
pure Anti-Corruption Organizations are often in line with international norms from the 
beginning. One can not draw the conclusion that Watchdog Organizations are strengthened by 
donors. Some Watchdog Organizations are marginalized. But the organizations strengthened 
by donors are all Watchdogs. Thus, the idea of heterogenization by the Alternative Critical 
View is given stronger credibility than before. 
  
Therefore, the hypothesis that the effects of Budget Support are different on watchdog- and 
service delivery organizations is given a weaker credibility in the relation to the GoU effects 
of marginalization, following the Liberal Mainstream View; but the hypothesis is given a 
stronger credibility in the relation to donors’ effects of marginalization and donors’ effects of 
Norm Socialization Process, following the Alternative Critical View. Thus, according to the 
result the answer is two-parted. The GoU tends to marginalize organizations, regardless of 
their structure. Donors tend to marginalize Service Delivery Organizations more than 
Watchdog Organizations and strengthen Watchdog Organizations more than Service Delivery 
Organizations. The probability has increased that advocacy- and evaluation indicators, which 
Watchdog Organizations are based on, is more important for donors than service related 
indicators, which Service Delivery Organizations are based on, because the former are more 
in line with the new idea of partnership principles that the donor community is focusing on. 
When donors provide Budget Support, they allow receiving states to use their own allocation, 
procurement and accounting system to simplify the procedures. To maintain an effective 
funding mechanism, advocacy and evaluation are cornerstones in the Budget Support process. 
To evaluate distribution is important so the funding is not swindled. Therefore, donors tend to 
be more interested in Watchdog Organizations.  
 
However, there is a bias in objects investigated. Watchdog Organizations were interviewed 
more than double compared to Service Delivery Organizations. If the numbers would have 
been more equal, the result might have been different. Consequently, one can not draw too 
heavy a conclusion out of this.          
7.3. Why have these effects occurred? 
Many quotes from the interviews, shown in chapter 6, indicate a marginalization of AC-CSOs 
by the GoU. The quotes show actions from the GoU which can be applied to Weber’s theory. 
The GoU uses its power as position- and object relation, where the GoU has the position and 
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AC-CSOs are the objects. As the GoU is in a higher position than AC-CSOs, the GoU settles 
its will on AC-CSOs, for example with the help of the NGO law. Ten out of the sixteen 
organizations expressed negative concerns over the NGO law and it is a serious problem for 
the relationship between Civil Society and the GoU. Clearly the GoU abuses its power over 
the AC-CSOs to maintain their higher position. 
 
The first two of the three ideal typifications by Weber can describe the situation in Uganda. 
The rational legitimized ground, where the authority is having the right to govern to maintain 
a fixed order is applicable in the case of Uganda, where the GoU has stayed in power for over 
20 years, much because they have relatively stabilized the situation compared to the civil war 
that Uganda was in before. The GoU’s ability to implement Western ideals like PRSP, HIPC 
and PAF, has contributed to a poverty reduction in the country. This has also helped them to 
consolidate their power. People accept their way to govern, even the marginalization of AC-
CSOs, because of this. The second ideal type, where authority is based on traditional ways of 
appointing a leader is also visual in Uganda. As dictatorship is the traditional way of power, 
one can see that repressive and volatile actions are based in the tradition of authority in 
Uganda. This is shown in Uganda with the NGO law and the disrupted democratic 
demonstrations for example. The long-term governance, the stabilization, the implementation 
of Western ideals and the traditional culture of authority are processes that all in some ways 
lead to an outcome of marginalization, with repressive attitudes and actions against AC-
CSOs. The third ideal type, where authority is based on a charismatic legitimized ground is 
not visual in the result of this thesis, even though President Museveni might have these 
abilities. Thus, the tendency of marginalization once again gives the Weberian ideals stronger 
credibility over the hypotheses of the norm socialization process, the boomerang effect, or 
patron/client relationships.      
 
There are no strong tendencies in the relation to donors. Nearly half of the AC-CSOs are 
marginalized and nearly half of them are increasingly strengthened. So the best answer to give 
is that donors use their power to position themselves as the authority against the objected AC-
CSOs, based on Weberian ideals. But donors also are strengthening AC-CSOs by 
implementing international norms into their agenda in order to transform the society. The 
strengthened organizations are far-reaching in the process. They are all in the second or third 
part of the Norm Socialization Process and the norms are accepted and internalized in most of 
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the cases. Thus, the processes of Norm Socialization and Weberian ideals appear to be played 
out by different donors.  
 
The diverse answer in research question three can be explained by the result of research 
question two; there is diffusion among Watchdog - and Service Delivery Organizations. There 
is a tendency that the former more easily than the latter adapt the norms created by donors and 
then implement them. Donors also tend to marginalize Service Delivery Organizations rather 
than Watchdog Organizations. It can also be explained by the fact that donors are several in 
numbers comparing to the GoU, which make them dissimilar. Therefore, the outcome may 
depend on which type of donor that is influencing the AC-CSOs. However, one must 
remember that almost half of the AC-CSOs interviewed tend to be marginalized by donors. 
Thus, donors do not give AC-CSOs the possibility to stop the marginalizing process. They are 
not doing enough to maintain a well functioning Civil Society. So they tend to undermine one 
original purpose of Budget Support by their actions.      .  
7.4 Final discussion  
The aim of this thesis was to discover effects from Budget Support implementation on Anti-
Corruption Organizations (AC-CSOs). The results show that most of the organizations are 
marginalized by the Government of Uganda (GoU) and almost half of them are marginalized 
by donors. Clearly, donors tend to prefer AC-CSOs who have a Watchdog function rather 
than a Service Delivery function, because Watchdogs are generally more in line with the 
ideals of the international donor community. But as the marginalization factor overshadows 
other factors, the conclusion must be that Budget Support tends to undermine its purpose in 
Uganda. The long-term governance, the stabilization, the implementation of Western ideals 
and the traditional culture of authority are processes that have lead up to a weaker and fragile 
Civil Society. The outcome has been a repressive attitude toward AC-CSOs and their actions. 
The NGO law is an example of that. The results show tendencies that Budget Support is part 
of that process. As the distribution of funds goes directly to the GoU, they receive more 
power. The process leads to the outcome of a problematic relation with AC-CSOs. One 
important factor for Uganda to obtained Budget Support was to have a well functioning Civil 
Society. This thesis shows tendencies that Civil Society, or AC-CSOs to be specific, has 
become weaker since Budget Support implementation. Thus, the structure of Budget Support 
is not sustainable in Uganda 
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Appendix: 
Appendix 1: Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 
AC-CSOs Anti-Corruption Organizations  
ACCU Anti-Corruption Coalition of Uganda   
BS Budget Support 
CAV Critical Alternative View 
CS Civil Society 
CSO Civil Society Organization 
GBS General Budget Support 
GoU Government of Uganda 
IDD International Development Department, University of Birmingham  
IGG Inspectoral General of Government  
IMF International Monetary Fund  
INGO International Non Governmental Organization 
LMV Liberal Mainstream View 
LNGO Local Non Governmental Organization  
NGO Non Governmental Organization  
NRM National Resistance Movement  
OAG Office of Auditor General  
ODA Official Development Assistance 
PAF Poverty Action Fund 
PEAP Poverty Eradication Action Plan  
PRSC Poverty Reduction Support Credit 
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
SBS Sector Budget Support  
SWAp Sector Wide Approaches 
WB World Bank 
Appendix 2: Interview guide  
 
Start/Introduction: 
 
1. Explanation of my aim of study 
2. Ask if it is ok to tape the interview 
3. Explain that IP will be anonymous 
4. Ask if IP has any questions before I start the interview 
 
The Organization: (Only asked when I do not have the information) 
 
5. Tell me about the organization?  
-What are the core issues? 
-How are your organization financed? What actors are receiving the funds 
(donors/government)? 
 
The relation to Budget Support: 
 
6. Is budget support a positive initiative according to anti-corruption organizations in 
Uganda? How do you experience budget support? 
   
7. Has your organization been transformed since budget support was implemented? If so, 
how?  
 
The relation to Donors: 
 
8. What main sources of donor funding are available for your organization? (Only asked 
when I do not have the information) 
 
9. a) Has donor funding risen or fallen over the past five years?  
b) What are the factors behind this change? 
c) Is your organization satisfied with this outcome? 
 
10. a) Is it generally easy to access funds from donors? (What major obstacles does your 
organization have to confront in this process? How complicated are the application 
forms, monitoring- and reporting requests?)  
b) Is it easier to access funds from donors today than five years ago? 
  
11. What type of activities comes with the donor funding for your organization to 
undertake? Is the activities different comparing to five years ago? 
12. Has your organizations work and structure been transformed in response to changes in 
donor funding and policies? If so, how has this affected your work with the core 
issues?   
 
The relation to Government (GoU): 
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13. a) Is it generally easy or difficult to deal the government? (What major obstacles does 
your organization have to confront in this process? How complicated are application 
forms, monitoring- and reporting requests?)  
b) Is it easier or more difficult to deal with the government today than five years ago? 
  
14. What type of activities comes with the government funding for your organization to 
undertake? Is the activities different comparing to five years ago? 
 
15. Has your organizations work and structure been changed in response to changes in 
government policies? If so, how has this affected your work with the core issues? 
 
The relation between Donors, Government and Anti-Corruption Organizations: 
 
16. a) If we look the relationship between Donors, GoU and AC-CSOs in Uganda, what 
role does an organization like yours playing? 
b) Was the role the same for five years ago? 
c) Is the role of anti-corruption organizations satisfying for donors and GoU or do they 
want to change it? 
 
17. a) Map out the most important meetings between Donors, GoU and AC-CSOs in 
Uganda. 
b) Is your organization invited? Why/Why not? 
 
18. a) Do AC-CSOs have influence on the agenda with Donors and GoU? Does your 
organization have it? Is your core issues ignored or not? Why/why not?  
b) Do you feel that you can participate on the same permits? What actor/actors have 
most power? Was it different five years ago? 
 
Level of International Network: 
19. If your core issues are excluded from the dialogue with GoU or donors (or in some 
other way are feeling ignored), how does your organization work for the issues? 
 
20. Does your organization have international actors who help you in your work with the 
core issues? Who are they? How do they help? 
 
21. If you will put pressure on your government or donors, what strategy will you use? 
Will you receive international help?  
 
Finish: 
 
22. Is it something you would like to add? 
23. Can I contact you again if I have any more questions?  
24. Are you interested in observing my final result when they are done? To what e-mail 
address can I send it? 
 
Thank you!  
 
 43
Appendix 3: Results of Budget Support effects on AC-CSOs  
Organization: Donors GoU 
1 Norm Socialization Process Marginalization 
2 Marginalization Marginalization 
3 Norm Socialization Process Marginalization 
4 Marginalization Marginalization 
5 Patron/Client Patron/Client 
6 Norm Socialization Process Marginalization 
7 Norm Socialization Process Marginalization 
8 Marginalization Marginalization 
9 Marginalization Marginalization 
10 Norm Socialization Process Marginalization 
11 Norm Socialization Process Marginalization 
12 Norm Socialization Process Boomerang Effects 
13 Marginalization Marginalization 
14 Marginalization Marginalization 
15 Marginalization Marginalization 
16 Patron/Client Patron/Client 
 
Appendix 4: Elements of the Poverty Action Fund in 1997/98 
- Special treatment – The PAF identified and gave special treatment to specific pro-
poor sector/sub-sector/programmes in the budget. 
- Matching resources to expenditures – a PAF table matched specific resources from 
HIPC, donors and the government to the budget allocation for PAF programmes. 
- Additionality of resources – PAF resources were shown as additional to the 
government’s own budget allocations to PAF programmes in the 1997/98 budget. 
- Protection of disbursement – PAF programmes were protected from cuts during 
budget implementation. 
- Reporting and transparency – there were specific requirements for the government 
to report on disbursement on PAF programmes, and progress in implementation. 
Reports were made public and discussed in open quarterly meetings, where Civil 
Society, the press and donors were present.    
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- Monitoring – 5 % of PAF fund were set aside for enhanced monitoring and 
accountability 
Source: (IDD et al 2, 2006:16)  
Appendix 5: Prerequisites for Partnership Principles (PEAP2 2001) 
Governments will: 
- Continue to increase its focus on poverty eradication 
- Continue with the increased tax effort 
- Assume full leadership in donor coordination 
- Decline any offers of stand alone donor projects 
- Strengthen monitoring and accountability 
- Continue to improve transparency and combat corruption 
- Continue to strengthen district capacity 
- Develop comprehensive, costed and prioritized sector wide programmes, eventually 
covering the whole budget 
- Further develop participation and coordination of all stakeholders (including 
parliamentarians) 
- Strengthen capacity to coordinate across government 
 
Donors will: 
- Jointly undertake all analytical work, appraisals, reviews 
- Jointly set output/outcome indicators 
- Develop uniform disbursement rules 
- Develop uniform and stronger accountability rules 
- Ensure all support is fully integrated into sector wide programs and is fully consistent 
with each sector program’s priorities 
- Continue to increase the level of untied sector budget support 
- Increase the level of delegation to country offices 
- Abolishing topping up of individual project staff salaries 
- End individual, parallel country programs and stand alone projects 
- Progressively reduce tying of procurement 
 
Source: PEAP Volume 3, Annex 1, 2001(in IDD et al 2, 2006:17)    
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Appendix 6: PRSC Objectives  
 
PRSC1 (2001) PRSC 3 Matrix (2003) PEAP 3 Matrix – PRSC 5 (2005) 
PEAP PILLAR 1 – Framework 
for Economic Growth and 
Structural Transformation. 
PRSC objective: Efficient and 
Equitable Use of Public Resources: 
 
Allocation and actual expenditures, 
Intergovernmental Transfers, 
results orientation 
 
Number of actions: 6  
PEAP PILLAR 1: Framework 
for Economic Growth and 
Structural Transformation.  
PRSC objective: Efficient and 
Equitable Use of Public Resources: 
 
Allocation and actual expenditures, 
Intergovernmental Transfers, 
results orientation and monitoring 
and evaluation, financial sector 
 
Number of actions: 12 
 
PEAP PILLAR 1: Economic 
management: 
 
Macroeconomic stability consistent 
with rapid private-sector led 
growth. 
 
Number of Actions: 24 
PEAP PILLAR 2 – Ensuring 
Good Governance and Security. 
PRSC Objective: Improve service 
delivery through cross-cutting 
reforms: 
 
Improving management systems in 
the public sector: Public service 
management, procurement, 
financial management, M&E. 
 
Increase transparency, participation 
and reduce corruption. 
Transparency, civil society, 
corruption, legal and judicial 
reform.    
 
Number of actions: 21 
PEAP PILLAR 2 – Ensuring 
Good Governance and Security. 
PRSC Objective: Improve service 
delivery through cross-cutting 
reforms: 
 
Improving management systems in 
the public sector: Public service 
management, procurement, 
financial management, M&E. 
 
Increase transparency, participation 
and reduce corruption. 
Transparency, civil society, 
corruption, legal and judicial 
reform.    
 
Number of action: 33 
PEAP PILLAR 4 – Good 
Governance: 
Strengthened Political Governance 
Improved Human Rights  
Public Sector Management and 
Accountability 
 
Number of Actions: 42 
 
PEAP PILLAR 3 – Security, 
Conflict Resolution and Disaster: 
Protection of persons and their 
property through elimination of 
conflicts and cattle rustling, 
resettlement of internally displaced 
persons and strengthened disaster 
management. 
Number of actions: 15 
PEAP PILLAR 3 – Directly 
increasing the ability of the poor 
to raise their incomes. No PRSC 
Objectives: 
Plan for Modernization of 
PEAP PILLAR 3 - Directly 
increasing the ability of the poor 
to raise their incomes. PRSC 
Objective: Promotion of Enabling 
Environment for Rural 
PEAP PILLAR 2: Production, 
Competitiveness and Incomes: 
 
Increased, more efficient Private 
Sector Production; agriculture 
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Agriculture. 
 
Number of Actions: 0 
 
Development: 
 
Research and technology, Ag. 
Advisory Services, Rural Finance, 
Agro Processing and Marketing, 
Natural Resources Management, 
District Roads. 
 
Number of Actions: 12 
 
production; sustainable forestry 
production non-agriculture goods 
and services.  
 
Strengthened infrastructure 
Strengthened Env. And natural 
resources management regime.  
 
Strengthened financial sector in 
support of production. 
Number of Actions: 62     
PEAP PILLAR 4 – Direct 
improving the quality of life of 
the poor. PRSC Objective: 
Improve Delivery of Basic 
Services:  
 
Improve quality of education: 
successful sector review, primary 
education, cost efficiency. 
 
Improve quality of health care: 
successful sector review, 
healthcare financing, procurement 
capacity and policy, human 
resources, health infrastructure. 
 
Improve Access and Equity in 
Water and Sanitation: access to 
rural water and sanitation, access 
in small towns, access in urban 
areas.  
Number of Actions: 19 
PEAP PILLAR 4 - Direct 
improving the quality of life of 
the poor. PRSC Objective: 
Improve Delivery of Basic 
Services: 
 
Improve quality of education: 
successful sector review 
 
Improve quality of health care: 
successful sector review. 
 
Improve Access and Equity in 
Water and Sanitation: access to 
rural water and sanitation, access in 
small towns, access in urban areas. 
 
Number of Actions: 13 
PEAP PILLAR 5 – Human 
development: 
 
Better educated Ugandans. 
 
Healthier Ugandans. 
 
Improved water and sanitation 
systems. 
 
Inclusive and Empowered 
Communities. 
 
Number of Actions: 55 
Total Number of Actions: 46 Total Number of Actions: 70 Total Number of Actions: 201 
(IDD et al 2, 2006, table 3C.1, s200) 
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